clude risk, mispricing, taxes, and liquidity. They find some limited evidence for the risk explanation, showing that a small part of the differential returns on discount firms relative to premium firms can be explained by a Fama and French (1993) three-factor model. They find even less support for explanations based on liquidity and mispricing. One other line of research deals with informational problems associated with conglomerates; these issues could also potentially lead to higher expected returns for diversified firms [see Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) , Hadlock, Ryngaert, and Thomas (2001), Gilson, et al. (2001) ].
In this paper, we seek to add to our understanding of why firms with diversification discounts have higher expected returns. We consider an explanation based on the return distributions of the stocks of diversified firms relative to single-segment firms. Specifically, we consider whether investors pay a premium for single-segment firms because the return distributions of single-segment firms have higher upside potential (positive skewness) than do the return distributions of diversified firms. If investors have a preference for stocks with positive skewness, then stocks of diversified firms may have to offer higher returns in order to compensate investors for a lack of upside potential.
The assumption that investors would place a premium on stocks with greater skewness exposure is grounded in theory. Arditti (1967) and Scott and Horvath (1980) demonstrate that investors with typical preferences demonstrate a preference for positive skewness in return distributions. Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) and Harvey and Siddique (2000) build on these results to develop asset pricing relationships in a representative agent framework, finding that an asset's coskewness with the market portfolio should be priced. Other research shows that even idiosyncratic skewness may be a priced component of stock returns. Barberis and Huang (2005) show that when investors have preferences based on cumulative prospect theory, stocks with greater idiosyncratic skewness may command a pricing premium. Mitton and Vorkink (2006) , in a model incorporating heterogeneous investor preference for skewness, also predict a pricing premium for stocks with idiosyncratic skewness. The optimal expectations model of Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) also produces qualitatively similar asset pricing implications for skewness as Barberis and Huang (2005) and Mitton and Vorkink (2006) .
If investors place a premium on return skewness then, for example, a diversified firm with three divisions (and a single stock) could trade at a discount to a comparable portfolio of the stocks of three matched firms, even if the three matched firms generate expected cash flows identical to the expected cash flows of the diversified firm. The difference is that holders of the diversified firm's stock are unable to capture the potential skewness exposure that each of the separate divisions would otherwise offer. In order to capture greater skewness exposure, investors must remain underdiversified. Skewness exposure is rapidly eroded by diversification [Simkowitz and Beedles (1978) ], and thus in the presence of skewed returns, investors may optimally choose to remain underdiversified [Conine and Tamarkin (1981) ]. Barberis and Huang (2005) , Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) , and Mitton and Vorkink (2006) all show that, even in equilibrium, investors may remain underdiversified to capture return skewness.
But diversified firms force diversification on investors, thereby removing the possibility of capturing skewness from investors that would underdiversify in order to do so. In the process, diversified firms may erase any pricing premium that otherwise would have been attached to divisions with potential skewness exposure.
The results of our empirical tests are consistent with a skewness-based explanation for the expected-return portion of the diversification discount. First, we study how stock return distributions vary according to the degree of corporate diversification of the firm. We find that the return distributions of focused firms are more highly skewed than the return distributions of diversified firms. Single-segment firms, on average, offer skewness exposure more than double that of the most-diversified firms. The difference in skewness exposure persists when we compare diversified firms with an industry-matched portfolio of single-segment firms. To do this, we compute a measure of "excess skewness" for each diversified firm, which is analogous to measures of "excess value" used previously in the literature for computing diversification discounts. We find that, on average, the excess skewness of diversified firms is negative, indicating that diversified firms erode skewness exposure relative to their single-segment comparables.
Second, we explore whether the skewness exposure of diversified firms is cross-sectionally related to the valuation of diversified firms. We estimate regressions of excess value on excess skewness and find that diversification discounts are significantly greater in firms that have less skewness exposure relative to single-segment comparables. In other words, investors tend to discount diversified firms when the diversification is associated with a loss of upside potential for that firm's stock. This result persists when we include in the regression proxies for existing cash-flow-based explanations for the diversification discount.
Finally, in our last set of tests we directly confront the question of why firms with diversification discounts have higher expected returns. We study whether exposure to skewness helps explain the excess returns of discount firms relative to premium firms, as documented by Lamont and Polk (2001) . To do so, we create an "excess skewness factor" that captures the differences in return skewness between discount firms and premium firms. We find that the differential return between discount firms and premium firms loads significantly on this excess skewness factor. We find that differences in skewness exposure can explain a substantial portion of the return differential between discount firms and premium firms. The excess skewness factor alone reduces pricing errors of the return differential portfolio by about 40 percent. In contrast, the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model reduces pricing errors by about 15 percent. In short, skewness exposure appears to have a first-order effect in explaining why firms with diversification discounts have higher expected returns.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes the data used for our empirical tests.
Section II explores how corporate diversification affects investors' exposure to skewness. Section III studies whether diversification discounts are cross-sectionally related to differences in skewness exposure. Section IV reports results on whether skewness exposure explains excess returns on discount firms relative to premium firms. Section V concludes.
I. The Sample
Our sample consists of all firms in the Compustat database between 1977 and 2003. We begin with 1977 because this is the first year for which Compustat segment data are available. The Compustat segment data identify the different business segments in which a firm operates, where segments are defined at the four-digit SIC-code level. In addition, the data report the proportion of a firm's sales and assets that are attributable to each segment. We define a firm as diversified in a given year if it reports more than one segment in Compustat for that year.
We combine the Compustat segment data with stock return data from the CRSP database.
For consistency with previous literature [see, e.g., Lamont and Polk (2001)], we exclude some observations from this sample. We exclude firm-year observations for which we do not have accompanying stock return data from the CRSP database. Our focus is on monthly stock returns, and at a minimum, we require that the firm have stock return data for at least ten of the twelve months in the calendar year subsequent to the date of the accompanying Compustat segment data. We eliminate financial firms from the sample by excluding any firm-year observation in which one or more of the firm's segments has an SIC code between 6000 and 6999. We also exclude any firm-year observations for which data on sales or assets are missing for any of the firm's segments, in which the sum of sales reported for the firm's segments is not within one percent of total reported sales for the firm, or in which annual sales for the firm are less than $20 million. After these exclusions we have an average of 2,623 observations (including diversified and single-segment firms) for each year from 1977 to 2003.
II. Diversification's Effect on Return Skewness
In this section we study the relationship between the level of corporate diversification in a firm and the return distribution of its stock. At this point in the analysis we do not yet consider whether diversified firms trade at a discount, we simply want to understand whether corporate diversification in general leads to a loss of skewness exposure. It is natural to suppose that this might be the case. Simkowitz and Beedles (1978) show that portfolio diversification leads to a loss of skewness exposure, with the majority of skewness exposure being eroded with the addition of just a small number of securities to the portfolio. Diversification into unrelated businesses at the corporate level might also be expected to erode skewness exposure of the firm's stock, but the degree to which this occurs is not well understood.
To study this relationship, from the monthly stock returns we calculate return statistics for each sample firm in each year. We calculate the mean monthly return and the variance of monthly returns in the twelve months subsequent to the date of the Compustat segment data. In addition, our primary return statistic of interest is the skewness of stock returns, which we measure as the skewness coefficient,
where the coefficient is calculated from the twelve-month window of monthly returns andσ 3 is the cube of the estimated return standard deviation. An important feature of the skewness coefficient is that it is scaled by the variance of returns. Thus, equation (1) The final column of Table I reports our primary statistic of interest, the skewness of returns. On average, the skewness coefficient for single-segment firms is 0.31, which is the highest among all categories of diversification. As the number of operating segments increases, the average skewness coefficient decreases monotonically. Diversified firms with seven or more operating segments have an average skewness coefficient of only 0.10. The higher skewness of undiversified firms indicates that an investor holding the stock of a single-segment firm is much more likely to experience extreme positive returns than is an investor holding the stock of a diversified firm.
A. Return Skewness by Level of Diversification
To give some intuition of what higher skewness coefficients mean, in practical terms, we consider the outcomes that would be attained by investors in single-segment versus diversified firms. We rank the firm-year observations from Table I according to the annual return achieved, and consider the set of firms with the highest annual returns -those in the top one percent of all annual returns during the 27-year sample period. We find that this set of "extreme winners", which consists of stocks with annual returns above 280 percent, is dominated by single-segment firms. Whereas single-segment firms make up 72 percent of the sample as a whole, single-segment firms comprise 87 percent of the set of extreme winners.
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(Single-segment firms dominate the set of extreme winners despite the fact that they have lower average returns than diversified firms, as shown in Table I .) Investors seeking strong upside potential may rightly be attracted to the stocks of single-segment firms. Table I shows that corporate diversification is associated with less skewness exposure, but it does not take into account possible differences in the industries in which firms operate. It is possible, for example, that single-segment firms tend to operate in industries that inherently offer more return skewness. To further assess to what degree skewness is eroded through corporate diversification, we create a measure of "excess skewness" for each diversified firm in our sample. Our measure of excess skewness is analogous to the measure of excess value that is used in previous literature on the diversification discount to assess the loss of firm value associated with diversification. Whereas excess value compares the value of a diversified firm to the value of a comparable portfolio of single-segment firms, our measure of excess skewness compares the return skewness of a diversified firm to the return skewness of comparable singlesegment firms, reflecting the skewness alternatives investors face. 3 To calculate excess skewness, we begin with all diversified firms in the sample. For each diversified firm (in each year) we calculate return skewness as in equation (1) the set of matching firms. We then define the "imputed" skewness of each diversified firm, denoted S imputed , as the weighted average of the comparable skewness measures from each segment. In calculating imputed skewness, weighting is done by the proportion of sales or assets attributable to each diversified segment of the firm. Imputed skewness measures for a diversified firm with n segments are then defined as:
B. Excess Skewness of Diversified Firms
segment skewness estimates. We find no significant changes to our results using alternative skewness measures.
We also vary the sample length for constructing skewness estimates, and use daily data to construct skewness estimates. In all of these cases we also find qualitatively similar results.
where wa j (ws j ) is the fraction of the diversified firm's assets (sales) in segment j, N j is the number of single-segment comparable firms in segment j of the diversified firm, and S i is the skewness estimate of single-segment firm i.
Excess skewness for each diversified firm, denoted ES, is then calculated as the firm's actual skewness minus its imputed skewness: ES =S-S imputed . Thus, excess skewness reflects the incremental return skewness achieved by the firm above that achieved by comparable single-segment firms. A negative ES measure would imply that the diversified firm has eroded skewness exposure relative to what its individual operating segments might have had separately. Table II (2), (3), (4), and Table II, which report excess skewness. Mean excess skewness ranges from -0.04 to -0.07 (depending on the calculation method) and median excess skewness ranges from -0.07 to -0.10, indicating that, on average, diversified firms offer substantially less skewness than comparable industry-matched single-segment firms. Because the results in Table II effectively control for differences in the industries in which firms operate, they imply that corporate diversification erodes skewness exposure for the firm's stock.
III. Is Excess Value Related to Excess Skewness?
In this section we study whether the magnitude of diversification discounts is cross-sectionally related to excess skewness. To do so, we first calculate excess values (relative to single-segment firms) for each diversified firm in the Compustat segment database between 1977 and 2003.
Our procedure follows from the work of Berger and Ofek (1995), Lamont and Polk (2001) , and others. Our two measures of value are Q and M, where Q is the market-to-book ratio (total market value over total book assets) and M is the market-to-sales ratio (total market value over annual sales). We calculate Q and M for all firms in the sample, whether diversified (defined as having two or more segments in the Compustat database) or single segment.
To compare the value of diversified firms to single-segment firms, we calculate comparable 
where Q i (M i ) represents the q (market-sales) ratio of single-segment comparable firm i.
Excess value for each diversified firm, denoted as EV Q or EV M , is then calculated as the natural logarithm of the ratio of the value measure to its imputed value, i.e., EV Q = log(Q/Q imputed )
and EV M = log(M/M imputed ). 
A. Regression Results
We conduct a regression analysis of the relationship between excess values and excess skewness that will allow us to control for other factors that determine a firm's excess value. In particular we estimate the following panel regression:
where EV i,t is one of four measures of excess value of firm i for year t, ES i,t is a measure of firm i's excess skewness for year t, and x i,t is a vector of instruments that may include firm, industry, and/or market wide variables. We construct ES i,t based on equation (1) using returns from date t through 12 months forward. We construct ES i,t in this manner to reflect investors' expectations of skewness for the firm's equity over the future. However, this measure is not known at time t. To construct a time t measure of forecasted skewness we run a preliminary estimation that regresses ES i,t on a set of t − 1 variables and define the predicted values of this regression as ES * i,t and use the predicted values of this regression as ES * i,t . More formally, we estimate both the skewness forecast regression and equation (10) as a system of equations using two-stage least squares. Our use of a two-stage estimation approach to equation (10) can also be motivated based on the potential endogeneity of our excess skewness measure. Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001) find that price is a strong predictor of skewness, consequently ES i,t and ε i,t in equation (1) are likely to be correlated, leading to biased coefficient estimates. Two-stage estimation of ES * i,t and equation (10) will correct for the endogeneity as long as instruments can be found that are correlated with excess skewness but uncorrelated with ε i,t . We use lagged values of firm return, variance, and skewness, as well as month and industry dummy variables as instruments to predict excess skewness. Following Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001) we also include the portion of a firm's stock held by insiders and based on Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) we include the standard deviation of analysts forecasts of earnings as a measure of difference of opinion. All of these instruments are known at time t to the investor making the first-stage predicted value, ES * i,t , a feasible estimate of expected skewness at time t.
Table IV reports estimated coefficients and standard errors for equation (1) using our four measures of excess value for two different sets of x i,t . We estimate a "simple" model where we regress excess values on ES * i,t and the variable prank, the lagged quintile of a firm's stock price. The variable prank is included to control for the strong relationship between price and skewness as documented in Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001) . The results of the simple model are reported in the first, third, fifth, and seventh columns. We also estimate a "full" model, where in addition to the variables in the simple model we include regressors that have been The results of estimating equation (1) We conduct a number of robustness checks to determine the sensitivity of our results to our model specifications. Our robustness checks include adding other variables to equation (10) including time trend, monthly dummies, a dummy variable for the fiscal year end month of a particular firm, lagged firm and benchmark returns, variances and skewness measures. We also treat prank as endogenous and construct predicted values using our instruments similar to our treatment of ES i,t . We construct our skewness estimates using 36-and 60-month forward-looking horizons using monthly returns. We also construct excess skewness measures using daily returns. None of these robustness checks changes the sign of β 1 or its general statistical significance. In contrast, we do find that when we remove prank from equation (10) the coefficients on β 1 are often negative and significant, a result which may be explained by the strong relationship between skewness and price.
Diversified firms trading at a discount tend to offer less upside potential (skewness) than 
IV. Excess Returns and Skewness Exposure
In this section we get to the heart of the matter and study why firms with diversification discounts have higher expected returns. We test whether skewness helps to explain differential returns on diversification-discount firms relative to diversification-premium firms. We posit that diversified firms offering relatively low skewness (e.g., by embedding and hence diversifying highly skewed segments) will have higher expected returns (lower valuations) than firms offering high levels of skewness. To this end, we first characterize the return properties of portfolio strategies based on diversification and then discuss an empirical investigation into the relationship between diversified firm portfolios and skewness.
Table V details the return properties of three portfolio strategies based on various exposures to diversification. The four columns under the "Premium Portfolio" heading report return statistics for a portfolio that takes a long position in diversified firms trading at a premium (EV Q > 0 or EV M > 0) and shorts a portfolio of single-segment comparable firms. 4 The four columns under the "Discount Portfolio" heading report return statistics for a portfolio that takes a long position in discount firms and shorts their single-segment comparables. The final two columns under the "Difference Portfolio" heading report return statistics that takes a long position in the discount portfolio strategy and shorts the premium portfolio strategy. The difference portfolio is constructed following the procedure outlined in Lamont and Polk (2001).
The difference portfolio allows us to focus on the cross-sectional difference between premium and discount diversified firms, and by isolating the focus onto diversified firms should provide greater power to our tests in the presence of firm effects that are common across diversified firms but vary relative to single-segment firms. We report return characteristics of these portfolio strategies using four different approaches to determine a firm's excess value: asset weighted using the mean of single-segment information for imputed values, (EV Q(Mean) ), asset weighted using medians of single-segments, (EV Q(Med) ), sales weighted using means of singlesegments, (EV M(Mean) ), and sales weighted using the medians of single segments, (EV M(Med) ).
The particular approach is denoted in the first column of Table V (less negative) than corresponding measures for discount portfolios. This difference is driven not only by slightly higher skewness estimates for premium diversified firms but also because single-segment comparables for premium firms have slightly lower average skewness estimates than single-segment comparables for discount firms.
If skewness were the only determinant of excess values, the negative excess skewness values for the premium portfolio in Table V would contradict the skewness hypothesis. Diversified premium firms do offer more upside (skewness) than diversified discount firms, but, similar to discount firms, premium firms offer less skewness than their single-segment comparable firms. We do not investigate specific explanations for firms to have negative excess skewness and trade at a premium, other than to note that many theories predict value enhancements from diversification. 5 We note that the R 2 of the regressions in Table IV indicate that only about 10-15 percent of the variations in excess values can be explained by both our excess skewness and cash flow measures. In addition, the nature of the relationship between skewness and diversified premium firms is also borne out in the subsequent portfolio analysis and is consistent with our hypothesis. Factors based on excess skewness help to explain premium firm differential returns in similar magnitudes as discount firm differential returns.
A. Portfolio Results
It is surprising that expected return explanations have received such little attention in the diversification-discount literature given the striking difference in average returns between discount and premium portfolios reported in Table V , which are similar to averages in reported in Lamont and Polk (2001) . We conduct empirical tests to determine how much of the variation in average returns on these portfolios excess skewness can explain. Our empirical work follows Lamont and Polk (2001); we conduct traditional asset pricing tests and report our results of these tests in Tables VI and VII.   Table VI reports output from regressions of the difference portfolio returns (long discount portfolio and short premium portfolio) on a Fama-French three-factor model as well as regressions where we also include a measure of portfolio excess skewness. Regressions using excess skewness measures as a pricing factor present problems as the interpretation of the pricing errors would be contaminated by the inclusion of a pricing factor that cannot be interpreted as a portfolio return. However, following Huberman, Kandel, and Stambaugh (1987) we can construct an excess skewness factor, (r ES ), by regressing the portfolio excess skewness, (ES), on a set of portfolios and an intercept as follows:
where r p,t is a k ×1 vector denoting the candidate set of mimicking portfolios, and γ is a vector of regression coefficients. We let r ES =γr p,t , whereγ is estimated using linear regression, implying that the mimicking portfolio will have maximal correlation to the excess skewness factor.
One important point to make is that our excess skewness factor is not a common factor in the traditional sense. Typically asset pricing factors are intended to explain systematic variations in the cross section of returns. In our case, each test asset (or portfolio) would have an associated excess skewness factor. Because our tests are univariate, this dilemma is in large part mitigated as we require only one excess skewness factor in each of our tests.
Thus, adopting the methodology of Huberman, Kandel, and Stambaugh (1987) allows us to interpret the resulting pricing errors of an excess skewness model relative to pricing errors of traditional models such as the Fama-French three-factor model.
We estimate equation (11) for our measures of excess skewness using the set of 25 size and book-to-market sorted portfolios introduced by Fama and French (1993) as our set of mimicking portfolios. 6 For the estimations reported in Table VI , our measure of excess skewness is the difference between the excess skewness of the relevant discount portfolio and the excess skewness of the associated premium portfolio.
We estimate three variations of the following asset pricing model:
r dp,t = α + β 1 r MKT,t + β 2 r SMB,t + β 3 r HML,t + β 4 r ES,t + ε t ,
where r dp,t is the return on the designated diversified portfolio strategy denoted in the first column of Table VI , r MKT,t is the excess return on the market portfolio, r SM B,t is the return on a portfolio that takes a long position in small cap stocks and a short position in large cap stocks, and r HML,t is a portfolio that takes a long position in high book-to-market stocks and a short position in low book-to-market stocks [see Fama and French (1993) ]. The first variation we estimate is the Fama-French three-factor model and is obtained by setting β 4 = 0. We report the three-factor estimation results in first two rows of each portfolio sort in Table VI .
The second variation we estimate is a one-factor excess skewness model and is obtained by setting β 1 = β 2 = β 3 = 0. We report the one-factor model estimation results in the third and fourth rows of each portfolio sort. The last variation estimates the full version of equation (12) including all four pricing factors. We report the estimation results of the four-factor model in the fifth and sixth column of each portfolio sort.
Under the null of skewness preference, β 4 should be negative to reconcile the higher expected returns on stocks that have more negative values of excess skewness (stocks that destroy skewness through segment diversification). Enticing skewness-preferring investors to hold stocks with little relative skewness comes at the cost of higher expected returns. Equation (12) implies that months in which the return on the difference portfolio is large and positive should also be accompanied by large disparities in skewness offered by stocks of diversificationdiscount firms relative to stocks of diversification-premium firms.
We estimate the three variations of equation (12) using our four different approaches to construct excess values described above and noted in the first column of Table VI . The second column in Table VI reports the average return of the specified portfolio sort as well as the standard error of the average return.
The Fama-French three-factor model estimation results reported in Table VI are similar to Lamont and Polk (2001); the coefficients on the market return are small and negative and the coefficients on the size factor (SMB) and the value factor (HML) are positive and significant. Table VI for the other three portfolio sorts with the overall average pricing error decrease of 15 percent for the Fama-French three-factor model. The three-factor model loads most heavily on the HML portfolio suggesting that a value effect helps to explain the relationship between excess values and subsequent returns consistent with the abundance of value-type effects found in asset prices. Yet, even though the inclusion of the HML factor is statistically important, large residual pricing errors remain. 8 We see in Table VI that the estimated coefficients on the excess skewness factor, β 4 , are always negative and statistically significant, consistent with our hypothesis. The onefactor skewness model performs very well when compared with the Fama-French three-factor model. For example, the pricing errors of the one-factor excess skewness model are, on average, 30 percent lower than the three-factor pricing errors and over 40 percent lower than the unconditional portfolio returns. The three-factor model does have higher R 2 s than the one-factor model but the differences are surprisingly small; the average three-factor model R 2 is 25 percent and the average one-factor model R 2 is 18 percent.
The four-factor model's results also favor the inclusion of the excess skewness pricing factor. Even with the addition of the three traditional pricing factors, β 4 remains negative and significant, although in all cases β 4 is less negative in the four-factor model than in the one-factor model. The estimated values on the other three factor remain similar to estimated values for the three-factor model. The pricing errors of the four-factor model also tend to be close to the pricing errors of the one-factor skewness model. These values are lower than their three-factor model counterparts and indicate that any pricing error improvements of the three-factor model are primarily independent of the pricing improvements generated by the excess skewness factor. The increase in R 2 s of the four-factor model relative to the FamaFrench three-factor model are large, nearly 38 percent on average. The R 2 s increases also highlight the independent explanatory power offered by the excess skewness factor.
We find that the coefficients for the asset-based (M) approaches are larger in magnitude than the sales-based (Q) counter parts and we find little distinction in the results for the mean-based results versus the median-based results. Overall the results of Table VI signify that higher spreads between discount and premium portfolio returns correlate strongly and negatively with excess portfolio skewness portfolio.
B. Premium Versus Discount Portfolios
The results of Table VI appear to support the notion that investors penalize diversified firms that embed segments, which if available as securities themselves, would offer positive skewness in returns. These results pit the returns of diversification-discount firms against the returns of diversification-premium firms. In this section we compare the returns of diversified firms against their single-segment alternatives to see how excess skewness relates to excess returns. In particular, we investigate the skewness return relationship for both the premium and discount portfolios.
If skewness were the sole determinant of value then we would not expect to see any diversified firms trading at a premium. Given that many diversified firms do trade at a premium and that even premium firms diversify away skewness relative to single-segment comparable firms, we break down the regressions of Table VI into their components to determine if the results hold for the diversified and premium portfolios individually. These results are reported in Table VII . As noted earlier, our difference portfolio returns are robust to effects common across diversified firms, and consequently, the estimations reported in Table VII may have less power to detect skewness factors given that we do not isolate out these potentially confounding effects.
For brevity, in Table VII we only report the estimates of the Fama-French three-factor model and the four-factor model adding the appropriately constructed skewness factor portfolio. Excess skewness factor portfolios are constructed using average excess skewness measures on the respective portfolio denoted in the first column of Table VII . We include the base regressions of Table VI on the difference portfolio for comparison purposes and we report the results for two portfolio sorts: EV Q(Mean) and EV M(Mean) .
We make three main observations regarding the estimations of Table VII . First, the excess skewness factor plays a role in explaining the differential returns of the both the discount portfolio and the premium portfolio. Estimated β 4 are negative and statistically significant in all cases. In fact, the estimated β 4 values are more negative and significant for the premium portfolio than the discount portfolio. While the larger β 4 coefficients would likely result from the lower excess skewness values on premium portfolios as shown in Table V , the fact that β 4 remains negative and significant for the premium portfolio suggests that the returns on these stocks are penalized for destroying skewness relative to their comparable single-segment stocks.
Our second observation is that the pricing errors of the four-factor model are much lower than the three-factor model pricing errors. On average, the four-factor model reduces pricing errors of 38 percent relative to the three-factor model and nearly 47 percent relative to the average portfolio returns. In fact, both discount and premium portfolio pricing errors using the asset-weighted portfolio sort become statistically insignificant for the four-factor model.
The pricing errors are larger for the sales-weighted results although the proportional reductions in pricing errors are still quite large.
Our third and last observation is that the fit of the asset pricing model is much stronger for the four-factor model as compared to the three-factor model. On average, the improvements in R 2 for the four-factor model relative to the three-factor model are nearly 41 percent. The fit improvements are much greater for the premium portfolio than for the discount portfolio. The average increase R 2 for the four-factor model relative to the three-factor model are 63 percent for the premium portfolio as compared to a 20 percent increase for the discount portfolio.
Somewhat surprising, we find that both the returns on the diversification-discount stock portfolio and the returns on the diversification-premium stock portfolio correlate strongly with associated excess skewness factors and that once these factors are included in an asset pricing context both the pricing errors are reduced and the amount of variation explained increases.
We find that our excess skewness/excess return relationship works on multiple levels, both at the diversified firm relative to single segment level as well as the diversification-discount firm relative to diversification-premium firm level. In sum, we find the results of Tables VI and VII strongly in support of the notion that investors prefer stocks with positive skewness strong enough to have pricing effects, and strong enough so that variations in firms' excess skewness explain much of the variation in average returns of diversified firms.
V. Conclusion
Investors have long realized that adding stocks to one's portfolio will both reduce risk and reduce the chance of an extremely high return, however little effort has been expended to understand how corporate diversification affects firm returns. We find that the forces reducing portfolio risk and skewness appear to operate in similar fashion within corporate diversification. Stock returns on firms with many operations have less variance and skewness than firms with one or few operating segments. This difference in skewness exposure persists when we compare diversified firms with an industry-matched portfolio of single-segment firms.
A natural question that arises from these results is how corporate diversification influences stock prices and expected returns, particularly in the presence of skewness-preferring investors. We find evidence of pricing effects connected to a firm's level of skewness diversification. Specifically, we find that firm-level measure of the skewness destroyed through segment diversification is significantly related to the valuation of diversified firms relative to an industry-matched benchmark of single-segment firms. We find that diversification discounts are significantly greater when the diversified firm offers much less skewness than typical focused firms in similar business segments.
Finally, we build on the work of Lamont and Polk (2001) by testing the relationship between differential returns on diversified firms and pricing factors based on skewness. We find that a substantial proportion of the excess returns received on discount firms relative to premium firms can be explained by differences in exposure to skewness, suggesting that investors penalize diversified firms for the degree to which the firm destroys skewness opportunities available in comparable focused firms. Diversified firms offering little skewness must offer higher expected returns to attract the attention of skewness-preferring investors. The table presents return characteristics on portfolios created by sorting diversified firms into either premium or discount excess portfolios (excess because the portfolio returns are in excess of the return on a portfolio of comparable single-segment firms). Q is the market-to-book ratio, and M is the market-to-sales ratio. Average N reports the time series average of the number of firms in the diversified portfolio. Excesss Skewness reports the time-series average of the differences between diversified firm return skewness and its benchmark skewness constructed using comparable single-segment firm skewness. Mean and Std. Dev columns report the time series estimates of the corresponding portfolio. The dependent variable, r Diff , is the return on a portfolio that is long a zero-investment portfolio of discount firms (short comparable single segment) and short a zero-investment portfolio of premium firms (short comparable single segment). The first column indicates the particular value measure used for portfolio sorting. Independent variables are the value-weighted market return in excess of the risk-free rate (MKT), the size factor return (SMB), the book-tomarket factor return (HML), and an excess skewness factor return (ES). The first three are introduced in Fama and French (1993) while the last variable is constructed by regressing the monthly differences between discount and premium portfolios excess return skewness on the 25 size-and book-to-market sorted portfolio returns. We use the fitted values to construct a factor mimicking portfolio. Our data set includes monthly returns from The dependent variable, r dp,Sort , is the differential diversified portfolio return as designated in the first column. Independent variables are the value-weighted market return in excess of the risk-free rate (MKT), the size factor return (SMB), the bookto-market factor return (HML), and an excess skewness factor return (ES). The first three were introduced in Fama and French (1993) while the last variable is constructed by regressing the monthly excess return skewness of the respective portfolio on the 25 size-and book-to-market sorted portfolio returns. We use the fitted values to construct a factor mimicking portfolio. Our data set includes monthly returns from 
